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The study of emotional changes after brain injury has contributed enormously to the
understanding of the neural basis of emotion. However, little attention has been placed on
the methods used to elicit emotional responses in people with brain damage. Of particular
interest are subjects with right hemisphere [RH] cortical lesions, who have been described
as presenting impairment in emotional processing. In this article, an internal and external
mood induction procedure [MIP] was used to trigger positive and negative emotions, in a
sample of 10 participants with RH damage, and 15 healthy controls. Emotional experience
was registered by using a self-report questionnaire. As observed in previous studies,
internal and external MIPs were equally effective in eliciting the target emotion, but the
internal procedure generated higher levels of intensity. Remarkably, participants with RH
lesions were equally able to experience both positive and negative affect. The results are
discussed in relation to the role of the RH in the capacity to experience negative emotions.
Keywords: emotion elicitation, emotional experience, brain injury, right hemisphere, emotion
INTRODUCTION
Research on emotional changes after acquired brain injury has a
long history (Gainotti, 1972, 2001; Borod, 2000; Adolphs, 2007),
contributing to a growing understanding of the neural basis of
several emotional processes, such as emotional perception (e.g.,
Adolphs et al., 2000; Borod et al., 2010; Tsuchida and Fellows,
2012), expression (e.g., Nakhutina et al., 2006; Kazandjian et al.,
2007; Borod et al., 2010) and experience (e.g., Anderson and
Phelps, 2002; Hornak et al., 2003; Gillihan et al., 2010; Feinstein
et al., 2010a,b; Feinstein, 2013).
Typically, studies on emotion use some type of mood induc-
tion procedure [MIP] to trigger the intended target emotion.
There are a wide range of MIP, such as self-referential state-
ments (e.g., Velten, 1968; Kenealy, 1986), autobiographical recall
(e.g., Brewer and Doughtie, 1980; Turnbull et al., 2004; Schaefer
and Philippot, 2005), imagery (e.g., Wright and Mischel, 1982;
Tranel et al., 1998) or film clips (e.g., Gross and Levenson, 1995;
Rottenberg et al., 2007; Schaefer et al., 2010). However, there is
little research comparing the effectiveness of each method (Isen
and Gorgoglione, 1983; Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Westermann
et al., 1996). Recently, it has been reported that internal MIPs
[autobiographical recall] generate higher levels of overall affect
compared to external MIPs [film clips] (Salas et al., 2012).
Because the successful triggering of target emotions is a prerequi-
site for measuring other more complex emotional processes, such
as emotional comprehension or regulation (Rosen and Levenson,
2009), the comparative effectiveness of different forms of MIP is,
itself, an important topic of research.
Notably, the correct selection of an MIP may well be critical
when experimental subjects present with cognitive impairments
that compromise the effective engagement with the stimuli, espe-
cially after acquired brain injury (Levenson, 2007). For example,
patients might struggle recalling details of personal events [auto-
biographical recall], or grasping the plot on a film [film clips]
(Levenson et al., 2008). Unfortunately, there has been no system-
atic research effort to address this issue. Thus, it seems timely to
explore which MIPs are best suited to elicit emotional states in
neurological patients.
Among the variety of patients with acquired brain damage,
subjects with unilateral lesions to the right hemisphere (RH) are
of particular interest for the topic of emotion elicitation. It has
been widely reported that, compared to subjects with left unilat-
eral lesions, they present a wide range of perceptual and expressive
emotional deficits (for a review see Borod et al., 2010), as well
as physiological hypo-reactivity to emotional stimuli (Heilman
et al., 1978; Morrow et al., 1981). Furthermore, it has been sug-
gested that RH lesions compromise specifically the processing of
negative, or withdrawal, emotions (for a review Gainotti, 2000),
often described as the valence hypothesis (Davidson, 1992a,b,
2001; Craig, 2005).
Unfortunately the evidence addressing emotion elicitation in
neurological patients is modest and presents important method-
ological limitations. For example, most of the studies have
focused on perceptual and expressive impairments, neglecting
whether or not RH damage compromises the subjective expe-
rience of negative emotions. Additionally, the studies that have
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addressed changes in emotional intensity have used ratings by
naïve judges as amethod, thus not considering the patient’s report
of his own experience (Borod et al., 1996; Montreys and Borod,
1998). To our knowledge there are only two case studies that
have experimentally addressed this problem, using an internal
MIP [affective story recall] to explore RH patient’s capacity to
experience negative emotions (Turnbull et al., 2004; Tondowski
et al., 2007). Both reported that individuals with RH lesions
were capable of experiencing similar levels of negative emotions
compared with controls, thus challenging the valence hypothesis.
Unfortunately these studies are based on the report of a single
case (Turnbull et al., 2004) or two cases (Tondowski et al., 2007),
opening the question of generalization. In addition, a further lim-
itation is that results are exclusively based on the rating of naïve
judges, thus not considering the patients subjective emotional
experience.
The present study is the first to offer some insight into this
problem, by comparing the effectiveness of two different MIPs, in
participants with unilateral RH damage, and a matched sample of
healthy controls. Following previous work on emotion elicitation
(Salas et al., 2012), internal [affective story recall] and external
[film clip]MIPs were used to elicit positive [amusement] and neg-
ative [sadness] emotions. The affective experience of participants
was registered using an adaptation of a well stablished self-report
questionnaire (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark, 1994).
The present study thus attempts to extend the findings of
Salas et al. (2012), which were based on a student sample, to
the key population of patients with RH damage, and neuro-
logically normal elderly controls. In addition, this study also
attempts to extend the findings of Turnbull et al. (2004), this time
using both internal and external MIPs, and self-reports, to test
whether participants with RH were able to experience negative
emotions [sadness]. Based on the results of Salas et al. (2012)
the following predictions were considered: (1) Selectivity: That
internal and external MIPs will selectively trigger the target emo-
tion, but not the non-target emotions, in both healthy controls
and neurological patients; (2) Intensity: That internal MIPs will
generate significantly higher levels of self-reported emotion, com-
pared with external MIPs, in both groups; (3) Right Hemisphere:
that patients with RH lesions will report lower levels of negative
emotional intensity than controls, when using both MIPs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants of this study were 10 subjects with right hemi-
sphere cortical damage (RH, Male = 4, Female = 6) and 15
healthy controls (HC, Male = 5, Female = 10). Both groups
werematched in age (RH:M = 61.9, SD = 11.9;HC:M = 62.80,
SD = 4.12) and education (RH: M = 13.63, SD = 1.36; HC:
M = 13.93, SD = 1.75). The average time since injury in the
ABI group was 55.8 months (SD = 34.84; MIN = 13, MAX =
114). Participants were referred by neurologists from Bangor
University and the North Wales Brain Injury Service. The study
was approved by the School of Psychology’s Ethics Committee
and by the North Wales Research Ethics Committee. Exclusion
criteria for the neurological group were having a non-focal lesion,
duration of less than 6 months since the brain injury, and
moderate to severe language impairment. The details of patient’s
lesion location are described in Table 1.
PROCEDURE
The assessment took place mainly at Bangor University. In cases
where participants with brain injury were not able to travel,
researchers tested them at home. The assessment involved two
sessions, of 2 h each. As a main introduction of the research,
they were told that they would be asked to recall personal events
in relation to certain emotions. In addition, they would have
to watch some movies on the computer, and report on how
they made them feel. For a detailed description of the proce-
dure adapted for this study see Salas et al. (2012). During the
first session, participants completed a set of measures of overall
cognitive functions and the Film Clip task. The Affective Story
Recall was administered during the second session, along with
other neuropsychological tasks that are not described here.
MOOD INDUCTION PROCEDURES
External mood induction procedure: film clips
In this task participants are asked to watch a series of film clips
and report their emotional experience while watching the clips.
For that purpose, participants were placed in front of a 15′′ laptop
screen. Headphones were provided to avoid any possible distract-
ing noise. The following instruction was offered: “I will ask you to
watch a couple of short film clips. Please pay attention and watch
them carefully”. After each film clip a self-report questionnaire
was administered. Before each “emotional” video a neutral video
was presented, and the following instruction was given: “Now
I would like you to watch this video and try to relax and clear
your mind of any thoughts”. The “emotional” clips [amusement-
sadness] were counterbalanced across participants of each group
to avoid order effects.
In relation to the neutral and emotional clips used, all of
them have been previously validated regarding their capacity to
elicit specific and discrete emotions (Gross and Levenson, 1995;
Table 1 | Clinical details of participants with acquired brain injury.
Age/Sex Months
since injury
Location Etiology
57 F 84 Right prefrontal MCA stroke
50M 20 Right prefrontal MCA ACA
stroke
73 F 88 Right prefrontal MCA stroke
45M 70 Right prefrontal ACoA SAH
74M 20 Right ventro-lateral prefrontal
cortex, basal ganglia
MCA stroke
65M 65 Right frontal and TPJ MCA stroke
46 F 114 Right prefrontal MCA stroke
63 F 60 Right prefrontal and TPJ MCA stroke
78 F 13 Right prefrontal MCA stroke
68 F 24 Right fronto-parietal MCA stroke
ACoA, anterior communicating artery aneurism; SAH, subarachnoid hemorrhage,
MCA, middle cerebral artery; ACA, Anterior cerebral artery; TPJ, Tempo Parietal
Junction.
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Rottenberg et al., 2007). The neutral clips, Sticks (Gross and
Levenson, 1995), were 60s in length and showed abstract shapes
and colors. The amusement clip, Bill Cosby Himself (Cosby, 1983)
showed a stand-up comedy performance by Bill Cosby (121 s).
The sadness clip, The Champ (Zeffirelli, 1979), showed a young
boy facing the sudden death of his father after a boxing match
(171 s).
Internal mood induction procedure: affective story recall
The Affective Story Recall task (Turnbull et al., 2004) was used as
an internalMIP for both amusement and sadness. In this task par-
ticipants are asked to recall personal events from their lives related
to specific emotions. As with the film clips, two neutral recall
conditions (going shopping and fixing a meal) are used before
each emotional recall as baselines. Each recall was prompted with
the following phrase: “Try to recall an event in your life that has
caused you to feel. . . (e.g., amusement). Try to be very detailed
about the way you feel.” Each participant had a maximum of
3min to describe the event, although they could use more time if
they felt they have not finished yet the story after 3min. A mini-
mum of time was not set, in order to avoid the possibility that task
instructions could activate negative emotions by adding pressure
and anxiety to the recollection. The same self-report question-
naire, administered after each clip, was also administered after
each recollection.
MEASURES
Neuropsychological assessment
A brief battery of neuropsychological tasks was used to obtain
a profile of the participants’ cognitive functioning. The Mini
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Rovner and Folstein, 1987)
was employed as a basic screening tool for overall cognition.
Sustained attention and divided attention were measured using
the Telephone Search from the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA,
Robertson et al., 1994). Comprehensive language was assessed
with the Token Test (De Renzi and Faglioni, 1978). The Bells
Cancelation test (Gauthier et al., 1989) and the Rey-Osterrieth
Figure Copy (Stern et al., 1994) were employed to explore visuo-
spatial abilities. In order to obtain a profile of verbal and visual
memory capacities, the Logic Memory task (WMS-R, Wechsler,
1987) and the Rey-Osterrieth Figure recall (Stern et al., 1994)
were used, respectively. The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB,
Dubois et al., 2000) was used as a general measure of executive
function abilities. Nevertheless, more specific tasks were also con-
sidered to explore such functions in detail. Working memory was
assessed using Digits, and abstraction ability was explored using
Similarities, both from the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). Finally,
verbal fluency from the D-KEFS (Delis et al., 2001) was used to
obtain a measure of letter fluency, category fluency and category
switching.
Emotional Assessment
In order to capture the emotional experience of participants,
after each clip and affective story, a self-report measure was
adapted from the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark, 1994). For a
detailed description of the construction of this scale see Salas
et al. (2013). The PANAS-X is a 60-item self-report that assesses
specific emotional states. It has a general dimension of positive
and negative affect, but also includes specific scales for discrete
emotions. Participants are asked to rate each of the 60 emo-
tional words (e.g., cheerful, hostile, shaky) indicating the extent
to which they felt each emotion according to a 5-point scale
(very slightly or not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, and
extremely). For the purpose of this study, following Salas et al.
(2012) a total of 20 emotional words were selected from the dis-
crete emotion scales, with 5 emotional words for each of the
four basic emotions [Joy: cheerful, delighted, happy, joyful, ener-
getic; Sad: downhearted, sad, blue, lonely, alone; Anger: disgusted,
angry, loathed, irritable, hostile; Fear: shaky, afraid, nervous,
scared, frightened].
DATA ANALYSIS
The average score of each PANAS’ subscale [Fear, Sadness, Joy,
and Anger] was calculated, for each eliciting stimulus [Neutral
1, Sadness, Neutral 2, Joy] on both tasks [ASR and FC]. To test
the Selectivity and Intensity hypothesis, the PANAS score for
each stimulus was compared using a mixed-anova test. More
specifically, to answer the Selectivity hypothesis, the analysis
was conducted separately for each stimulus and tasks, with the
four subscales of the PANAS treated as the within-subject vari-
ables and controls vs. patients as the between-subject variable.
The differences between the target emotion score and the other
emotions were calculated using a simple contrast, with the tar-
get emotion as reference. In relation to the Intensity hypothe-
sis, separated analyses for each stimulus were conducted, using
the target emotion in both tasks [e.g., sadness or joy] as the
within-subject variable, and controls vs. patients as the between-
subject variable. In both analyses, when the sphericity assump-
tion was not respected, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
(for Greenhouse-Geisser’s between 0.9 and 0.7), or multivari-
ate Pillai’s Trace statistic was reported (for Greenhouse-Geisser’s
less than 0.7). Finally, the exploration of the interaction term
in the mixed models allowed to test the third hypothesis (Right
Hemisphere), and assess whether the comparisons in the within
model differed between groups.
RESULTS
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
Data offered by the neuropsychological assessment is consistent
with existing literature on attentional and executive impairment
after right hemisphere damage (see Table 2). Individuals with RH
lesions exhibited scores above the cut-off point on the MMSE,
suggesting preserved overall cognition. However, their perfor-
mance on this screening task was significantly lower than controls.
When assessed in more detail, several cognitive areas appeared as
preserved: divided attention [Telephone Search TEA], language
[Token Test] and memory [Logical Memory and Rey-Osterrieth
recall].
The RH group presented with impaired performance on
visual scanning [Bell Cancelation tasks] and sustained attention
[Telephone Search]. These findings are consistent with evidence
suggesting that visual scanning impairment is common after
RH lesions (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011) and that sustained
attention is often compromised after damage to this hemisphere
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Table 2 | Summary of Neuropsychological Assessment.
Cognitive function Task RH (N = 10) HC (N = 15) p
M SD M SD
Overall cognition Mini Mental State Examination 27.8* 1.68 29.00 1.25 0.02
Attention Sustained attention [Telephone Search TEA] 7.88** 1.64 11.00 1.56 0.001
Divided attention [Telephone Search TEA] 10.00 4.89 11.00 1.79 0.24
Language Token test 30.40 1.43 31.13 1.35 0.10
Visuo-spatial abilities Bell test 21.6** 4.67 27.87 4.58 0.001
Rey-Osterrieth copy 30.10 6.59 34.00 3.12 0.06
Memory Logical Memory Immediate recall [WMS R] 12.50 3.26 13.67 3.43 0.20
Logical Memory Delayed recall [WMS R] 14.30 3.65 16.33 3.77 0.10
Logical Memory Recognition [WMS R] 13.22 1.39 13.86 1.52 0.16
Rey-Osterrieth recall 10.89 5.12 14.40 5.60 0.68
Executive functions Working memory [Digits WAIS III] 8.90 2.60 10.77 2.24 0.39
Abstraction [Similarities WAIS III] 9.63 3.29 11.86 3.31 0.65
Letter fluency [D-KEFS] 7.88* 2.22 10.71 3.26 0.02
Category fluency [D-KEFS] 7.75** 1.90 11.07 2.12 0.001
Category switching [D-KEFS] 8.25** 3.15 12.43 2.17 0.001
Frontal Assessment Battery Total Score 14.9* 1.91 16.62 1.93 0.02
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.
(Robertson et al., 1995, 1997; Leclercq et al., 2002), particu-
larly when the prefrontal region is involved (Wilkins et al., 1987;
Rueckert and Grafman, 1996; Stuss et al., 2002; Picton et al., 2006;
Shallice et al., 2008; Molenberghs et al., 2009).
In relation to executive functions, patients with RH dam-
age presented a mixed profile. Their overall score on the
FAB, a screening for executive function abilities, was above
the proposed cut-off score [12], however, their performance
was significantly lower compared to healthy controls. Working
memory [digits] and abstraction [similarities] were within
the normal range. Nevertheless, measures of verbal fluency
and task switching [letter fluency, category fluency and cate-
gory switching, D-KEFS] appeared impaired relative to popu-
lation norms, and were significantly lower when compared to
controls.
EMOTION ELICITATION
The present study tested three hypotheses: (a) Selectivity: that
internal and external MIPs will elicit the target emotion with
grater intensity than the non-target emotions, this in both groups;
(b) Intensity: that target emotions elicited by the internal MIP
will show greater intensity than the ones generated by the external
MIP, in both groups; (c) Right Hemisphere: that the neurological
group would present lower levels of negative emotional intensity
compared to the healthy control group when exposed to internal
or external stimuli.
Selectivity
Both MIPs elicited the two target emotions (e.g., sadness and
joy) effectively, with higher levels of intensity than the other
emotions considered in the PANAS (e.g., sadness/joy/anger/fear)
(See Figure 1). This result demonstrates that both inter-
nal and external MIPs are effective in inducing an emo-
tion selectively, for people with and without brain injury (see
Table 3).
Differences in the average intensity between target and non-
target emotions, for the two emotional stimulus, were observed
in the internal [Sadness: F(3, 57) = 34.34, p < 0.001, ηρ² =
0.64, r = 0.80; Joy: v = 0.92, F(3, 19) = 74.36, p < 0.001, ηρ² =
0.92, r = 0.96] and external [Sadness: F(2.44, 53.67) = 14.71, p <
0.001, ηρ² = 0.40, r = 0.63; Joy: v = 0.75, F(3, 20) = 19.45,
p < 0.001, ηρ² = 0.75, r = 0.87] MIP. All the planned com-
parisons between target and other emotions were significant in
both MIPs, as seen in Table 2. No differences across groups were
found [Interaction emotion∗group; Sadness Internal: F(3, 57) =
0.19, p = 0.91, ηρ² = 0.01, r = 0.10; Joy Internal: v = 0.12,
F(3, 19) = 0.84, p = 0.49, ηρ² = 0.12, r = 0.34; Sadness external:
F(2.44,53.67) = 1.13, p = 0.34, ηρ² = 0.05, r = 0.22; Joy external:
Joy: v = 0.14, F(3, 20) = 1.07, p = 0.38, ηρ² = 0.14, r = 0.37].
Thus, the comparison between the target emotion and the other
three emotions was statistically significant for each stimulus, in
both tasks, showing the same pattern in healthy controls and
neurological group.
Intensity
The internal MIP elicited higher levels of intensity in the target
emotion when compared to the external MIP, for both sadness
and joy. No significant differences were found between groups.
This result suggests that internal MIPs are more effective than
external MIPs in triggering intense emotional experience (see
Table 4).
The average intensity of the target emotion in the internal
MIP was higher than the external MIP for both sad [F(1, 18) =
22.53, p < 0.001, ηρ²= 0.56, r = 0.75] and joy [F(1, 20) = 11.10,
p = 0.003, ηρ²= 0.36, r = 0.60] stimulus. Thus, the compari-
son between internally and externally generated target emotions
was statistically significant for each stimulus, with no differences
between participants with and without brain damage [Sadness:
F(1, 18) = 0.99, p = 0.33, ηρ²= 0.05, r = 0.22; Joy: F(1, 20) =
2.08, p = 0.17, ηρ²= 0.09, r = 0.30].
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It is interesting to note, at an individual subject level, that 10/10
of the participants with RH cortical damage reported some level
of positive and negative emotion during the affective story recall
[Joy Range: 1.8–4.4; Sadness Range: 1.8–4.2]. A similar profile was
observed in controls [Joy Range: 2.4–5; Sadness Range: 2–4.8].
In relation to the film clips, only two participants reported not
FIGURE 1 | PANAS score for internal (ASR) and external (FC) Sad and
Joy stimuli. Both right hemisphere participants and healthy are
represented. In each the internal and external procedure induce slectively
the target emotion compared to non-target emotions. However, the internal
procedure generates higher levels of experienced emotion. Participants
with right hemisphere damage do not differ from controls in both
measures.
experiencing any degree of emotional response, one of them to
the sad clip, and the other to the joy clip. In general, participants
with RH cortical damage [Joy Range: 1.2–3.6; Sad Range: 1–3.4]
and controls showed a similar range of performance [Joy Range:
1.2–4; Sad Range: 1.2–4.4].
Right hemisphere
As reported above, participants with unilateral RH cortical dam-
age did not differ from healthy controls in level of intensity
reached by positive and negative target emotions, using inter-
nal and external MIPs. No significant interactions were observed
between group and levels of intensity, for both positive and nega-
tive emotions. In conclusion, the data did not support the hypoth-
esis suggesting that RH patients would not have selectively lower
levels of emotional experience. Results for all three hypotheses are
described in Figure 1.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was twofold. Firstly, it explored the effec-
tiveness of internal and external MIPs in an older adult sample of
people with RH cortical damage, and healthy controls. Secondly,
it tested whether participants with RH cortical lesions were able
to experience negative emotions using an internal and external
MIPs.
The first finding of this study is that the levels of intensity were
higher for the internally generated material. This is a replication
of the results reported by Salas et al. in a student sample (2012).
The present study extends these results by suggesting that a sim-
ilar pattern is also reported in elderly people, and also in those
with acquired brain injury. Interestingly, the material recalled by
participants (see Appendix) was qualitatively similar for patients
and controls and reflected the quantitative scores generated in the
PANAS-X. In addition, it was also found that levels of emotional
intensity, measured by self-report, were not significantly differ-
ent between participants with RH unilateral damage and healthy
controls, for both positive [joy] and negative [sadness] emotions.
The results from this study contribute to a growing literature
on the elicitation of emotion (Coan and Allen, 2007). When
these results are interpreted in relation to previous studies com-
paring the efficacy of internal and external MIPs (Salas et al.,
Table 3 | PANAS score differences between target and non-target emotions for the internal (ASR) and external (FC) MIP.
Mood induction procedure Target emotion Non-Target emotion Paired differences df F p ηρ ² r
Internal Sad Joy 9.91 1.19 89.35 <0.001 0.83 0.91
(Affective story recall) Anger 8.00 1.19 60.10 <0.001 0.76 0.87
Fear 5.81 1.19 36.44 <0.001 0.66 0.81
Joy Sad 12.65 1.21 154.80 <0.001 0.88 0.94
Anger 13.17 1.21 202.65 <0.001 0.91 0.95
Fear 12.08 1.21 155.10 <0.001 0.88 0.94
External Sad Joy 5.83 1.22 25.64 <0.001 0.54 0.73
(Film clips) Anger 4.92 1.22 20.48 <0.001 0.48 0.69
Fear 4.37 1.22 17.76 <0.001 0.45 0.67
Joy Sad 8.17 1.22 41.74 <0.001 0.66 0.81
Anger 8.3 1.22 54.03 <0.001 0.71 0.84
Fear 8.21 1.22 45.70 <0.001 0.68 0.82
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Table 4 | Comparison of the target emotion’s level of intensity when using an internal (ASR) or external (FC) MIP.
Target emotion Internal (ASR) External (FC) Paired differences
Mean SD Mean SD ASR-FC df F p ηρ ² r
Sadness in SAD 15.50 3.90 12.40 4.30 3.10 1.18 22.53 <0.001 0.56 0.75
Joy in JOY 18.05 4.53 13.18 5.09 4.87 1.20 11.1 <0.01 0.36 0.60
The internal MIP generates significantly higher levels of intensity.
2012), they appear to suggest that the higher levels of emotion
generated by the internal MIP are independent of age, for this
phenomenon is observed in both young and elderly adult popula-
tions. This is an interesting finding for the literature on emotion,
which has tended to focus on the structure of emotional intensity
(e.g., Sonnemans and Frijda, 1994; Verduyn et al., 2009), and the
individual determinants of intensity levels (e.g., Sonnemans and
Frijda, 1995; Neumann et al., 2001; Lynch et al., 2001), with less
consideration of the impact of the MIPs used (for a review see
Salas et al., 2012). This study offers important evidence support-
ing the view that emotion can be more intensely triggered when
using personally relevant material.
The data obtained by this study are also of relevance to
the elicitation and assessment of emotion in people with
acquired brain damage (Levenson, 2007; Levenson et al., 2008).
It shows that, in the same way as healthy controls, peo-
ple with right hemisphere lesions also generate higher lev-
els of positive and negative emotion when using internal
MIPs. This finding suggests that the recollection of personal
affective memories is also a powerful elicitor of emotional
states in this population, and that such recollection does not
appear to be compromised by the cognitive difficulties com-
monly associated with RH lesions [sustained attention and
executive impairment]. In fact, an exploratory analysis of
correlations between the level of emotional experience [self-
report scores] and cognitive abilities [sustained attention, work-
ing memory, delayed verbal recall, abstraction, verbal fluency
and divided attention] did not show any clear pattern of
association1 .
In terms of the RH debate on emotional experience, these
data suggest that the capacity to experience positive and neg-
ative emotions, when measured by self-report, is preserved in
patients with RH cortical lesions, offering group study support
for previous case studies (Turnbull et al., 2004; Tondowski et al.,
2007). Taken together, these findings also appear to challenge
the valence hypothesis, which proposes that the experience of
negative emotions is compromised after right cortical damage
(Davidson, 1992a,b; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Davidson, 2001;
Craig, 2005).
In addition, these data offers supporting evidence for a newly
developing perspective in affective neuroscience, which suggest
that emotion generation depends heavily on deep subcortical
structures, such as the brainstem [e.g., periacqueductal gray]
(Panksepp, 1998, 2011; Walla and Panksepp, 2013), and that the
1The only significant correlations found in the exploratory analysis were: ASR
[Joy]∗Sustained Attention [r = 0.45, p < 0.05]; Film Clip [Sad]∗Category
Fluency [r = 0.55, p < 0.01]; Film Clip [Joy]∗Abstraction [r = 0.44,
p < 0.05].
neocortex would have a role not in emotion generation, but in
the re-presentation and cognitive regulation of affects and feelings
(Panksepp, 1998, 2011; Damasio et al., 2000; Holstege et al., 2003;
Ochsner and Gross, 2007; Solms and Panksepp, 2012; Salas et al.,
2013, 2014; Walla and Panksepp, 2013; Turnbull et al., 2014a,b).
In relation to the role of the cortex in emotion generation, for
example, it has long been reported that emotional experience is
preserved after cortical damage and cortical atrophy (Shewmon
et al., 1999; Merker, 2007). In a recent single case study, Damasio
et al. (2012) reported findings from a man [patient B] with exten-
sive bilateral damage to the insula, a cortical area often suggested
(Craig, 2008, 2009, 2010) by neuroimaging studies as involved
in bodily feelings and the experience of emotions. The authors
found that all aspects of feelings appeared to be intact in patient
B, suggesting that the insula cannot have an exclusive role in the
processing of feelings. Taken together with the findings reporting
that cortical areas are not involved in emotional experience [as
reviewed above], these data suggest that the experience of emo-
tion is mediated by subcortical [basal ganglia] and specially deep
subcortical [brain stem complex] brain areas (Panksepp, 1998,
2011; Damasio, 2000).
It is also clear that many subcortical areas often associated
with emotion are not core to emotional experience. For exam-
ple, one study that compared individuals with amygdala damage
and controls, found no differences between groups in terms of
dispositional affect and day-to-day generation of affective states
(Anderson and Phelps, 2002). In a case study of a subject with
bilateral amygdala damage [SM] (Feinstein et al., 2011), it was
found that only the induction of the experience of fear appeared
to be impaired, and that the triggering and experience of other
emotions was spared. Furthermore, in a subsequent case group
study, Feinstein et al. (2013) explored the experience of fear and
panic in individuals with bilateral amygdala damage, using a
novel paradigm that involved CO2 inhalation. Interestingly, it
was reported that all three patients experienced panic attacks,
and that the bilateral amygdala lesions did not interfere with the
capacity to express or experience fear, or fear related emotions
[panic or anxiety]. The authors offer several possible interpreta-
tions for these challenging data. They suggest, for example, that
the amygdala may have a regulatory role in the inhibition of fear.
They also proposed that previous studies reporting the absence
of fear experience in patients with amygdala lesions have used
exteroceptive stimuli [processed cortically via visual and auditory
pathways], while CO2 appears to engage interoceptive afferent
sensory pathways, that project to the diencephalon, insular cortex,
and deep subcortical structures such as the brainstem.
The present study has two main limitations. The first might
be argued to be small sample size, though we note that previ-
ous studies (Turnbull et al., 2004; Tondowski et al., 2007) have
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been at the level of single case reports. Nevertheless, these data
would clearly benefit from confirmation with a larger popula-
tion. The second limitation is that this study only focuses on
subjective emotional experience, not capturing physiological or
behavioral correlates. This is an important issue, since there is evi-
dence pointing to relatively modest levels of convergence between
subjective, behavioral and physiological findings, together with
reports of dissociations between these response systems (for a
review see Mauss and Robinson, 2009). These data has led some
authors to recommend the use of multiple measures that can cap-
ture different aspects of the emotional response (Mauss et al.,
2005; Lyons et al., 2013; Walla et al., 2013), while others have sug-
gested efforts to improve the way self-reports are used, in order
to develop better first person methods (Nielsen and Kaszniak,
2007). However, thus far the literature on emotional changes after
brain damage has by and large failed to consider the subjective
experience of emotions, mostly focusing on individuals’ ability to
perceive or express feelings [see introduction]. A main goal of this
preliminary study has been to correct this bias.
It is important to note that the effort to investigate emotional
experience does not only have value for the neuroscientific com-
munity, but is also important for those interested in the link
between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. The main goal of the
neuropsychoanalytic enterprise is to understand the neural basis
of complex psychological processes that lie at the heart of what
we call subjective experience, of which emotion is a core ele-
ment (Solms and Turnbull, 2011; Turnbull and Solms, 2004,
2007). In this context, the observation of emotional changes,
using a first person perspective has been a key methodological
tool (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Salas et al., 2014). This
study has attempted to follow this tradition, by putting back, as
a focus of research, subjective experience while retaining a degree
of experimental control.
It is interesting to note that our findings challenge previous
data from behavioral [facial] (e.g., Borod et al., 2002) and phys-
iological studies (Heilman et al., 1978; Morrow et al., 1981),
which suggest that individuals with RH damage are impaired in
expressing, understanding and physiologically reacting to emo-
tional stimuli. There are a number of possible explanations for
this apparent inconsistency. One explanation might be the reli-
able existence of dissociations between the subjective, cognitive
and somatic/behavioral components of the emotional response
- we currently have incomplete data to make this judgment.
The design of future studies that consider all three compo-
nents at once (Mauss et al., 2005) will offer valuable insight.
An alternative explanation might be that perceptual/expressive
and physiological deficits, after RH damage, are not a direct
consequence of impaired emotional reactivity, but the result of
deficits in cognitive abilities that are necessary to trigger adequate
emotional responses. Thus, the patient might lack the cogni-
tive abilities [e.g., attention, high level visuo–spatial skills] to
distinguish (say) a sad face, but retains the experience of sad-
ness when elicited by other routes. A final explanation might
be that the low emotional reactivity reported by early studies
is a consequence of dynamic psychological factors, of a “defen-
sive” nature, perhaps related to impairment of emotion regulation
rather than in the direct experience of emotion (Turnbull et al.,
2014a).
For decades emotional changes after brain injury have
contributed to our understanding of the neural basis of
emotional processes (Damasio, 1994; Borod, 2000; Gainotti,
2001; Robinson, 2006; Adolphs, 2007; Rosen and Levenson, 2009;
Feinstein, 2013). However, little attention has been placed on the
methods used to trigger emotional responses (Levenson, 2007;
Levenson et al., 2008). This study has contributed to the field
by showing that internal and external forms of elicitation are
both effective in triggering selective emotional states, although
the internal procedure generates higher levels of intensity. More
importantly, it suggests that these methods are also effective in
triggering negative emotional states in patients with RH unilat-
eral damage, a population that has been traditionally described as
impaired in the capacity to experience negative emotion.
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